Skip to content
PE & M&AMay 18, 20269 min read

EBITDA Add-Backs Buyers Will Actually Accept (and the Ones They Won't)

Most owners present a generous EBITDA. Most buyers retrade half of it. Here's how to predict which add-backs survive diligence — and which won't.

What an add-back is, and why it matters

Your P&L shows what you actually spent. But some of what you spent is not what a new owner would spend. If you pay yourself $600K to run a business a hired executive would run for $250K, the extra $350K is not really an operating cost — it is an owner's choice. Add it back, and you get a cleaner picture of what the business earns.

That cleaner picture is adjusted EBITDA, and in a sale it is the number that gets multiplied. At a 9x multiple, every dollar of accepted add-back is nine dollars of enterprise value. Every dollar rejected is nine dollars gone.

This is why owners get aggressive with add-backs and why buyers get skeptical. And it is why the difference between a well-built add-back schedule and a hopeful one is often a seven-figure swing in price.

I have built these schedules as a seller and I have torn them apart as a buyer. The pattern is consistent enough to be useful.

The test every add-back has to pass

A quality of earnings team applies roughly the same three questions to every line you propose:

Is it non-recurring? Will this cost genuinely not exist next year, under any owner? A one-time legal settlement, yes. "Unusually high" recruiting costs in a year you opened two clinics, probably not — if your growth plan says you will keep opening clinics.

Is it non-operating? Is it unrelated to running the business? Your boat, yes. Your regional director's salary, no, no matter how much you would like to run leaner.

Is it supportable? Can you produce documentation? An invoice, a contract, a board minute, a bank statement. "I know it was about $80K" is not an add-back. It is a request.

The third test is where most add-backs die. Owners lose more value to missing documentation than to bad judgment. If you take one thing from this article: the add-back you can prove is worth more than the add-back you can argue.

Add-backs that usually survive

Owner compensation above market

The most valuable add-back in most ABA deals. If you take $600K in salary and distributions for a role that a hired COO or CEO would fill at $250K, the $350K delta is a legitimate adjustment.

The catch is that you have to replace yourself on paper. The buyer will ask what market compensation actually is for your role, and you need a defensible answer — a comparable job posting, a compensation study, an actual offer you have made to a candidate. Owners who assert a low replacement cost without support get normalized to a number the buyer picks instead.

Be honest about scope, too. If you personally handle payer contracting, clinical oversight, and every hiring decision, replacing you costs more than one salary. Claiming a $180K replacement for a job that genuinely requires two people invites the QoE team to distrust the rest of your schedule.

Family members not working in the business

A spouse on payroll at $90K who does not have a role is a clean add-back, well documented by the absence of any work product. Uncomfortable to discuss, straightforward to adjust.

If the family member does work — genuinely — then you adjust to market for the work performed, not to zero.

Genuinely personal expenses

Vehicles used personally, travel that was not business travel, club memberships, the family phone plan. Small individually, meaningful together. These add back cleanly when they are documented and consistently identified.

What kills them is inconsistency. If you add back a vehicle in 2025 but the same expense sat in operating costs in 2024 without adjustment, the QoE team will normalize both years and ask what else was handled inconsistently.

One-time legal and professional fees

A litigation settlement that has concluded. A one-time payer audit defense. The cost of a failed transaction. These are non-recurring by nature.

The test is whether it is truly over. An ongoing dispute with a payer is not non-recurring — it is a liability the buyer is about to inherit, and raising it as an add-back draws attention you may not want.

Real transaction costs

Investment banking fees, legal fees, and sell-side QoE costs for this deal add back without argument. They exist only because you are selling.

De novo clinic losses, with discipline

This one is worth real money in ABA and it is frequently mishandled.

A clinic opened eight months ago is not yet at maturity. It carries full rent, a full clinical team, and a partial caseload. It loses money. That loss is a function of the ramp, not of the economics.

Buyers will often accept normalizing a de novo to its expected mature contribution — if you can show a ramp curve from your own history. If you have opened four clinics and can demonstrate that each reached breakeven at month eleven and target margin at month eighteen, you have a credible model, and the adjustment usually survives.

If this is your first new clinic and the ramp curve is a projection, expect it to be rejected or heavily discounted. The difference is entirely in whether you have historical evidence.

Add-backs that usually get rejected

"Lost revenue" from anything

The single most common overreach. Revenue you did not earn is not an add-back. A BCBA left in March and the caseload did not fully transfer, so you propose adding back $200K of revenue you would have had. No.

Buyers reject this universally, and for good reason: turnover is a normal, recurring feature of the business. Every ABA company loses clinicians. A buyer will lose them too. Adding back the effect of a normal operating event is asking to be paid for a business you do not have.

The exception is genuinely extraordinary and external — a clinic closed for four months by a fire, with an insurance claim documenting the closure. Even then, expect to fight for it.

Recruiting and turnover costs

Same logic. Recruiting BCBAs and RBTs is not an unusual event in ABA — it is the operating condition of the industry. Elevated recruiting costs in a growth year are the cost of growth, and the buyer is paying for the growth.

Owner salary when you are actually running the company

If you propose adding back your entire compensation because "the buyer will replace me," but you are the CEO and the buyer expects you to stay for three years, that is not an add-back. That is a request to be paid twice.

Anything that recurs every year

Sit with the schedule and look at three years side by side. If "one-time" consulting fees appear in all three, they are not one-time. QoE teams run exactly this test, and finding a recurring "non-recurring" item causes them to scrutinize everything else you proposed.

Deferred maintenance and capex you skipped

If you have underinvested in leasehold improvements or systems, that is not an add-back — it is a deduction. Buyers will identify the deferred spend and ask for a price adjustment. Proposing it as a positive adjustment is a serious credibility error.

Undocumented anything

Worth repeating because it is where the money goes. No invoice, no add-back.

Costs the buyer will add back down

This is the half of the exercise most owners never anticipate. Diligence is not only about removing costs — it is also about adding costs that a standalone company would carry and you currently do not.

AdjustmentWhy it appears
Public-company or sponsor-grade accountingYour bookkeeper is not a controller. A PE-owned platform needs real monthly close, audit support, and reporting. Expect $150K–$300K.
Market-rate rentIf you own the building through a separate entity and charge yourself below market, rent gets restated upward.
Insurance at institutional levelsMalpractice, cyber, D&O, employment practices — often higher than owner-operated coverage.
A real HR functionCompliance, credentialing infrastructure, and employment risk management at scale.
Compliance and clinical quality infrastructureDocumentation audits, supervision tracking, payer audit readiness.

None of these are punitive. They are what the business actually costs to run institutionally. But they can offset a meaningful share of your add-backs, and owners who have not modeled them are blindsided when the QoE report lands.

Model them yourself before you go to market. Knowing your number will be adjusted down by $400K is manageable. Discovering it in week nine of exclusivity is not.

How to build the schedule

Start eighteen months out, not eighteen days.

Tag as you go. Add a flag in your accounting system for potential adjustments and use it monthly. Reconstructing three years of add-backs from memory produces exactly the inconsistencies QoE teams look for.

Keep an evidence file. Every proposed add-back gets a folder with the invoice, contract, or statement supporting it. When diligence asks — and they will ask about every line — you send a folder instead of starting an investigation.

Be consistent across all three years. Apply the same treatment to the same category in every period. Inconsistency is the fastest route to a broad-based discount.

Write a one-line rationale for each item. Not for the buyer — for you. If you cannot articulate why an item is non-recurring in one sentence, it probably is not.

Run a sell-side QoE. Hire your own accountants to test the schedule before the buyer's do. It costs real money and it is the highest-return spend in the entire process. You find the weak items while you still have time to strengthen or drop them.

The strategic point

Owners tend to treat add-backs as a negotiation — start high, expect to get argued down, land somewhere reasonable.

That instinct is wrong here, and expensively so. A QoE team is not negotiating. They are auditing. When they find three items that clearly do not qualify, they do not just remove those three. They lose confidence in your judgment and apply harder scrutiny to everything else, including the legitimate adjustments you would otherwise have won.

I have watched a schedule with $1.1M of proposed add-backs come out of diligence at $400K — not because most items were bad, but because a handful of indefensible ones poisoned the credibility of the rest.

A tight, fully documented schedule of $800K will beat an aggressive schedule of $1.3M nearly every time. Credibility compounds.

Build the number you can defend line by line. Then defend it.

If you want a second set of eyes on a schedule before it goes into a data room, that is worth doing while you can still change something.

Next step

Let’s walkyour numbers.

I take on a small number of ABA clients at a time. Thirty minutes on your business, your numbers, and your next move — and a straight answer about whether I am the right help, whether or not you hire me.

Book a confidential call